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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are widely used intelligent technology in the century that 
provides user-oriented better solutions for real-time environment. WSNs have wide range of 
applications, such as, habitat monitoring, surveillance, location tracking, agriculture 
monitoring, structural monitoring, wild-life monitoring and water monitoring, are few 
examples (Akyildiz et al., 2002). Furthermore, numerous other applications require the fine-
grain monitoring of physical environments which are subjected to critical conditions, such 
as, fires, toxic gas leaks and explosions. Sensors’ sense the environmental data and transmit 
to the sink node using wireless communication, as shown in figure 1.    Thus the novelty of 
WSNs is providing inexpensive yet effective solutions for monitoring unattended physical 
environments. In addition, the ubiquitous nature of WSNs makes environmental data access 
possible anytime, anywhere in an ad-hoc manner. 
 
Fig. 1. Wireless sensor networks 
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A single node consists of on-board sensors, low computation processor, less memory, and 
limited wireless bandwidth. For example, a typical resource constraint node has 8 MHz 
microcontroller with 128 KB of read-only memory and 10 KB of program memory (Hill et 
al., 2000). Furthermore, a node is battery-powered (e.g., AAA batteries), thus it can operate 
autonomously, if needed. Therefore, a node able to collect the environmental information, 
processes the raw data, and communicates wirelessly with the sink. Most of WSNs are self-
organized that can make self-governing decisions (i.e., turn on/off actuators) and become a 
part of better distributed management and control system. 
The new wireless sensor technology has offered economically viable monitoring solution to 
many challenging applications (e.g., earthquake monitoring, military, healthcare 
monitoring, nuclear reactor monitoring, etc). However, deploying new technology without 
considering security in mind has often susceptible to attacks. As WSNs deals with real-time 
sensitive data that can be manipulated by any adversary for individual profit. Moreover, 
wireless nature of sensor node makes network more prone to the attacks. Thus security has 
always a big concern for wireless communication based applications. In addition, providing 
security to these resource constraints networks are very tedious task as compared to the 
resource rich networks, such as, local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks 
(WANs). While the WSNs security requirements are the same as conventional networks, 
such as confidentiality, authentication, availability, freshness and integrity. Thus security 
has emerged as one of the important issues in wireless sensor networks. 
Significant cryptographic protocols have been introduced in order to secure the link-layer of 
wireless sensor networks. These cryptographic schemes are either based on block cipher 
(i.e., SPINS ( Perrig et al., 2001), TinySec (Karlof et al., 2004 ), MiniSec (Luk et al., 2007 )) or 
on public key cryptosystem (TinyPK (Watro et al., 2004 )) and elliptic curve cryptography 
(TinyECC(Liu & Ning, 2007) and WMECC(Wang et al., 2006)). But due to the fact of limited 
memory and low computation of sensor nodes these protocol are still expensive in term of 
memory and computation. Furthermore, block cipher are always centred in cryptology, for 
instance, data encryption standard (DES) was considered as standard block cipher from 
1974-to-2000 (Ahmad et al., 2009). Thereafter, in 2001 Advanced encryption standard (AES) 
was selected as standard block cipher. In fact the security of AES has been implemented in 
hardware for sensor nodes (e.g., telosb (Polastre et al., 2005)), and successfully implemented 
in software as well (Roman et al., 2007). Furthermore, in (Law et al., 2006)) and (Roman et 
al., 2007), some block ciphers are benchmarked on MSP430 platform and deduced the best 
block cipher to use in the context of WSNs.  In (Roman et al., 2007) authors have surveyed 
public key cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography primitives for wireless sensor 
networks. While, the public key cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptography are 
computationally expensive and time consuming for sensor networks because they need to 
generates and verify the digital certificates. 
On other hand, stream ciphers have the simple structures, fast computations (i.e., encryption 
and decryption), but these ciphers are not popular in WSN security. In (Fournel et al., 2007) 
authors claim that the stream ciphers provide high level security services at low 
computation time, memory efficient, and easy to implement in software (i.e., few lines of 
code is required). Moreover, in 2004, the European Union started a project “named 
eSTREAM” ciphers aim to select a standard stream cipher that has comparable hardware 
and software security with efficiency (Henricksen, 2008), as AES.  In (Fournel et al., 2007) 
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authors have presented a survey and benchmark on stream cipher for dedicated platform 
and deduce the well-suited stream cipher for constraints devices. Authors argue that the 
stream ciphers could be a better solution, and could achieves fast encryption in resource 
constraint network applications. 
In Lim et al., 2007 and Kumar & Lee, 2009, proposed authenticated encryption which is 
known as Dragon-MAC1 for wireless sensor networks.  In Ahmad et al., 2009, have 
addressed authenticated encryption schemes, namely, HC128 –MAC, SOSEMANUK-MAC 
using eSTREAM ciphers for wireless sensor networks. In (Kausar & Naureen, 2009), authors 
have implemented and analyzed the HC-128 and Rabbit encryption schemes for pervasive 
computing in wireless sensor network environments. They have simulated lightweight 
stream ciphers (i.e., only encryption) for WSNs. 
Consequently, the stream ciphers are not adequately addressed and implemented in 
wireless sensor networks applications.  As the security services such as data authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, and freshness are become critical issues in wireless sensor 
networks and many exiting WSN applications are lacking of the link layer security. As 
result, there is still research potential at link layer security that would ensure and provide 
security services at low cost.  
In this regard, this chapter proposes a lightweight secure data framework using authenticated 
encryption.  An NLM-128 stream cipher is used for data or packet confidentiality (Lee et al., 
2009). In order to achieve the authentication and integrity services, a message authentication 
code (MAC) “named NLM-MAC” is incorporated into the sensor packets. The NLM-MAC 
ensures the message integrity and freshness of the authenticated packets. The proposed 
framework achieves security services at low computation cost (i.e. memory and time efficient). 
In order to minimize the computation cost of NLM-MAC algorithm, it is using some of the 
data already computed on NLM-128 stream cipher. In addition, the chapter discusses the 
following: (1) importance of security at the WSN link layer; (2) an adversary threat model that 
can be expected in WSNs; and (3) basic security requirements for wireless sensor networks.  
We have implemented the proposed framework on real-time test bed and our result confirms 
its feasibility for real-time wireless sensor applications too. In addition, we compared the 
proposed framework results with the existing stream ciphers that have been implemented in 
the resource constraints sensor networks.   
The rest of chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses (i) importance of security at the 
link layer; and (ii) an adversary threat model that can be expected in WSNs. Section 3 discusses 
the basic security requirements for wireless sensor networks, and Section 4 presents the related 
works with their weaknesses, if any. Section 5 proposed lightweight authenticated encryption 
framework for wireless sensor networks, and Section 6 evaluation of proposed framework in 
term of memory and computation time. In Section 7, conclusions are drawn for proposed 
authenticated encryption (NLM-MAC) and future directions are given.   
2. Important of security at the link layer and adversary network model  
This section discusses the importance of security at the link layer and adversary network 
model for wireless sensor networks. 
                                                 
1MAC is representing as message authentication code, otherwise explain. 
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2.1 Importance of security at the link layer 
End-to-end security mechanisms are not possible in sensor network as compared to traditional 
computer network (e.g., SSH (Ylonen, 1996), IPSec and SSL protocols). These protocols are 
based on route-centric. In traditional networks, the intermediate router only need to view the 
packet header and it is not necessary for them to have access to packet bodies. They are 
considered inappropriate since they are not allowed in-network processing and data 
aggregation which plays an important role in energy efficient data retrieval (Karlof et al., 2004).   
In contrast, for sensor networks it is important to allow intermediate nodes to check 
message integrity and authenticity because they have many-to-one multi-hop 
communication nature. The intermediate nodes carry out some of data processing operation 
(e.g., data compression, eliminate redundancy and so on) on incoming data packets to be 
routed towards to the base station. Thus, in-network processing requires intermediate nodes 
to access, modify, and suppress the contents of messages, if needed. Moreover, it is very 
unlikely that end-to-end security schemes are used between sensor nodes and base-station 
to guarantee the message integrity, authenticity and message confidentiality (Karlof et al., 
2004). More importantly, the link-layer security architectures can easily detects 
unauthorized packets when they are first injected into the network, whereas in end-to-end 
security mechanisms, the network may route packets injected by an adversary many hops 
before they are detected. These kinds of attacks waste the energy and bandwidth. Hence, 
security is an imperative requirement at the link layer. 
2.2 Adversary network model 
WSNs are vulnerable to attacks due to their wireless in nature. In addition the sensor nodes are 
deployed in hostile or unattended environment, and are not physically protected or guarded. 
An adversary can directly disturb the functioning of real-time wireless sensor network 
applications. By applying the adversary model, he/she can handle the application accordingly 
for their personal benefits. For simplicity, we have divided the adversary model as follows.  
 Data monitoring and eavesdropping: Since the sensor devices are wireless in nature, 
and wireless range are not confined. It may happen that an attacker easily snoops data 
from the wireless channels and have control on network contents, accordingly. Further, 
he/she may eavesdrop the network contents, such as sensor id, location and others 
network related information. 
 Malicious node:  An attacker can quietly place his/her malicious node into the 
network. By deploying malicious node into the network an attacker may control the 
entire wireless network or may change the route of network. 
  Data corruption:  Any message alteration from the networks, or bogus message 
injection into the networks could harm to the entire networks. He/she can potentially 
destroy the whole network and hence, network integrity compromised. Further, an 
adversary can replay the corrupted messages again and again, by doing so he/she can 
harm to the critical applications, e.g., healthcare monitoring, military and etc.  
3. Security requirements for wireless sensor network at link layer 
This section sketches out the important security requirements for WSNs, which are based on 
the above threat model and link layer requirements, as follows. 
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 Confidentiality: confidentiality, in which message is used by only authorized users. In 
sensor networks, message should not be leaked to neighboring node because sensor 
deals with very sensitive data. In order to provide the security, the sensor data should 
be encrypted with secret key.  Moreover, the secret key is intended to recipient only, 
hence achieved confidentiality.  
 Authentication: Authentication is associated to identification. Entity authentication 
function is important for many applications and for administrative task. Entity 
authentication allows verifying the data whether the data is really sent by legitimate 
node or not. In node-to-node communication entity authentication can be achieved 
through symmetric mechanism: a message authentication code (MAC) can be computed 
on secret shared key for all communicated data. 
 Integrity: Message integrity, which addresses the illegal alteration of messages. To 
conformation of message integrity, one must have the ability to identify data 
manipulation by illegal parties. 
 Freshness: In wireless sensor networks, data confidentiality and integrity are not 
enough if data freshness is not considered. Data freshness implies that the sensors 
reading are fresh or resent and thus an adversary has not replayed the old messages. 
4. Related work 
This section presents the related work for security protocols that have been proposed for 
wireless sensor networks.  
Perrig et al., 2001, proposed a security protocol SPINS for wireless sensor networks. It 
consists of two secure building blocks: (1) Secure network encryption protocol (SNEP), 
provides two party data authentication (point-to-point) communication. (2) micro-Timed 
efficient streaming loss-tolerant authentication protocol (µ-TESLA), provides efficient 
authenticated broadcast communication. In their scheme, all cryptographic primitives are 
constructed based on a single block cipher scheme. Author selected RC5 block cipher 
because of its small code size and high efficiency. RC5 is also suitable for ATmega platform 
because of memory constraints. A hash function is used with block cipher. 
Karlof et al., 2004, proposed another most popular wireless security architecture known as 
“TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks”. TinySec achieves 
low energy consumption and memory usage, and provides access control, message integrity 
and confidentiality. TinySec consists of two building blocks: (1) authenticated encryption mode 
denoted as TinySec-AE. In this mode, the data packet payload is encrypted and the whole 
packet is secured by a message authentication code (MAC). (2) Authentication only denoted 
as TinySec-Auth. In this mode, the entire packet is authenticated with a MAC, but the whole 
data packet is not encrypted. Author has tested two 64-bit block ciphers, i.e. Skipjack and 
RC5 for authenticated encryption mode and authentication only mode. Authors claims RC5 is 
more difficult to implement than Skipjack, so authors’ selected Skipjack as the default secure 
block crypto algorithm. In sensor networks, data travels on carrier sense in which node 
check, if another node is also currently broadcasting, than node will be vulnerable to denial 
of service (DoS) attack. TinySec security architecture gives protection from DoS attack, and 
is able to detect the illegal packets when they are injected into the network. One of the major 
drawbacks of TinySec, it does not attempt to protect from replay protection (Luk et al., 
2007). The replay protection is intentionally omitted from TinySec (Luk et al., 2007). 
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MiniSec (Luk et al., 2007) is the first fully-carried out general function security protocol, and 
implanted on the Telos sensor motes. MiniSec provides two controlling modes, i.e., unicast 
and broadcast, and recognized as MiniSec-U, MiniSec-B, respectively. Both methods use the 
OCB-encryption system that allows data confidentiality and authentication. By using 
counter as a nonce MiniSec provides the replay protection to the sensor nodes. For more 
details reader may refer to the (Luk et al., 2007). 
A TinyPK (Watro et al., 2004) protocol has proposed for WSN. It specifically designed for 
authentication and key agreement. In order to deliver secret key to the protocol, authors 
implemented the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. TinyPK is based on public key 
cryptography, which is memory consuming and time consuming for sensor networks. 
Lim et al., 2007 and Kumar & Lee, 2009, proposed Dragon-MAC for wireless sensor 
networks. In their schemes, encrypt-then-MAC is used, i.e., the sensor data first encrypted 
and then MAC is computed over the encrypted data. Two keys are used for encryption and 
authentication, respectively. Authors tested their schemes for Telos B family. The main 
weakness of Dragon, it is not suitable for some real-time applications, such as healthcare 
monitoring, military, etc. Because it has 1088 bits of internal states, which are not easy to 
maintain for the resource hungry sensor nodes.  
Zhang et al., 2008 proposed a security protocol for wireless sensor networks that exploits the 
RC4 based encryption cryptosystem and RC4-based hash function “called HMAC (hashed-
message authentication code)” is generated for message authentication.   
Ahmad et al., 2009 addressed SOSEMANUK-MAC and HC128-MAC authenticated 
encryption schemes using eSTREAM cipher for sensor networks. They did not provides any 
analytical or simulation analysis for their proposed work. 
In Kausar & Naureen, 2009, authors have implemented and analyzed the HC-128 and Rabbit 
encryption schemes for wireless sensor networks environment. They have simulated 
lightweight stream ciphers (i.e., only encryption) for WSNs, but their cost of encryption 
schemes are very high (Kausar & Naureen, 2009). More importantly, they implemented only 
encryption, which is not sufficient for real-time WSN applications. 
As we have seen the above, only few security schemes are well implemented and provide 
better security services to the WSNs. Further, many of stream ciphers are not implemented 
properly and provide less security services at high computation costs. So, next section 
present a lightweight secure framework for sensor networks that exploits the stream cipher 
and provides sufficient security services for WSN applications.    
5. Proposed authenticated encryption framework 
This section is divided into twofold: (1) introduction of NLM-128 keystream generator 
cryptographic protocol (Lee et al., 2009); and (2) proposed authenticated framework “named 
NLM-MAC” for wireless sensor networks which is based on a massage authentication code. 
The proposed scheme exploits the NLM-128 stream cipher based-security and facilitates the 
confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and freshness to the air messages.  
5.1 NLM-128  
A NLM-128 keystream generator proposed by Lee et al. in 2009, which is based on LM-type 
summation generator, and is designed with both security and efficiency in mind. It is a 
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combination of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a nonlinear feedback shift register 
(NLFSR), which are easy to implement in software as well as in hardware.  The length of 
LFSR and NLRSR is 127 bits and 129 bits, respectively. Both, LFSR and NLFSR give 258 bits 
of internal states to the NLM-128. Further, it takes 128 bits key-length and 128 bits 
initialization vector (IV) to fill the internal states. The simple structure of NLM-128 is shown 
in 2. 
 
Fig. 2. NLM-128 keystream generator 
5.1.1 Keystream generator 
The NLM-128 generator generates the output keystream using LFSR and NLFSR sequences, 
a carry bit (C), and a memory bit (D). It has two polynomials: a primitive polynomial Pa(x) 
and irreducible polynomial Pb(x), as following: 
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            
              
     
 (2) 
The output of keystream Yj , Cj and Dj are defined as following: 
 Yj= (ajbjcj-1) dj-1  (3) 
 Cj= ajbj(ajbj)cj-1  (4)   
 Dj= bj(ajbj)dj-1     (5)   
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5.1.2 Key loading and re-keying 
Initially, 128-bits key (key) and 128- bits initialization vector (IV) together feed to 257 internal 
states of NLM-128. To generate the initial state for keystream generator, it uses generator 
itself twice, as follows. 
 The initial state of LFSR-A is simply obtained by XORing of two 128-bits binary strings 
of the key (key) and IV , i.e., LFSR-A= (Key  IV) mod 2127. 
 The initial state of 129 bits for NLFSR-B is simply obtained by assuming the 128-bits key 
are embedded into 129-bits word and shifted one bit left. Then XORing with the IV 
embedded into 129 word with a leading zero, i.e., NLFSR-B= (key<<1)  (0|IV).  
 Now cipher is runs second time to produce an output string of length 257-bits. 
For more detailed specifications and NLM-128 security analysis, reader may refer to the (Lee 
et al., 2009). 
5.2 Proposed authenticated encryption 
A secure communication setup is needed in wireless sensor networks between two ends 
parties (i.e., sensor node and base station). In this regards, this subsection proposed an 
authentication encryption “named NLM-MAC” that setup secure communication between 
two ends parties and provides authentication, integrity and confidentiality, to their air 
messages. The proposed framework effectively utilise: (i) less space for key, and for message 
encryption, so that application’s other functions can have enough room; and (ii) less 
computation, which helps to increases the network lifetime. The idea of NLM-MAC is very 
simple: a message authentication code (MAC) is computes over the already encrypted data 
(i.e., NLM-128), and hence achieve security services, as follows. 
5.2.1 Data confidentiality   
To achieve the confidentiality, first, NLM-128 keystream generator initialize with 128 bits 
key length and 128 bits of initialization vector (IV). Later, the keys and IV feed into NLM-
128 internal states, which generates 128 bits output keystream, as discussed above (recall 
section 5.1). Thereafter, the output of NLM-128 keystream generator is ex-or with the 
plaintext that provide data confidentiality.  The simplicity and small size of NLM-128 makes 
it well suitable to the wireless sensor network environments. For NLM-128 security analysis 
reader may refer to (Lee et al., 2009). 
5.2.2 NLM-MAC (authentication and integrity) 
A message authentication code (MAC) is short piece of information that used to authenticate 
the two end parties and verify their integrity. For instance, if a sender attached a MAC to the 
message then it must be verified at receiver end in order to manage the access control.  The 
proposed NLM-MAC that is based on Lim et al (2007) and Kumar & Lee (2009) schemes, 
and offers general security services to the wireless sensor network, as discussed in the 
section 3. To compute MAC, considers a scenario where a sender (Alice) wants to set up a 
secure communication with a receiver (Bob), as follows: 
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 Initially Alice runs NLM-128 and encrypts the plaintext with encryption key (i.e., Key) 
and initialization vector (IV).   
 Then Alice computes a MAC over the cipher text using MAC-Key (i.e., Kmac), the 
procedure is shown in figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. NLM-MAC algorithm 
 Thereafter, Alice sends MAC, cipher text (Ct) and current time (Ta) stamp to the receiver 
end (i.e. Bob). 
 Upon receiving Bob the message (i.e., MAC, cipher text and time stamp)  
 Bob first check time stamp and compare MAC, if both checks pass then Alice is 
authentic and decrypt the cipher text with Key and obtained the plain text. 
5.2.3 NLM-MAC design 
The encrypted cipher text (Ct) is splitting into 32-bit blocks, and then padding the last word 
with zeroes, if required. Meanwhile, the MAC encryption key (Kmac) is fed through variables 
l, m, n, p and then Kmac is XORing 32-bit Ct with 32-bit of l, and hence obtained 32-bit MAC.  
 To integrate our authenticated encryption procedure into the sensor node, we add 2 bytes 
counter (ctr) and 4-bytes MAC into default radio stack (TelosB), as shown in figure 4. The 2 
bytes ctr used to achieve the semantic security and 4 byte MAC ensure the authentication 
and integrity. 
 
Fig. 4. Modified Telos B node packet format  
Pt = plaintext 
Ct= Ciphertext 
Key= Encryption key 
Kmac= MAC encryption key 
Ct[i]= ith Ciphertext 
 
 
1. Ct = Ekey (Pt) 
2. {l, m, n, p}= Kmac (128-bit) 
IV= 
[destpan||addr||type||group||count]*2 
3. {l, m, n, p} = Ct[i]  l, m, n, p 
4. NLM-MAC= l  m  n  p 
5. Output MAC(32-bits) 
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5.2.4 NLM-MAC analysis 
Generally, the initialization vector (i.e., IV) must unique for encrypted packets, the unique 
IV does not give additional rooms to an attacker (Karlof, 2004). Therefore, in the proposed 
framework, an IV is taken from the packet header that is modified radio (refer figure 4) and 
sends to the recipient end. As shown in the figure 4, a two bytes counter (ctr) gives 216 
variations to the initialization vector (IV). By doing so, it guarantees that message encrypted 
with same key should give different cipher text every time. The four bytes MAC length 
indirectly implies the computation cost which would be needed to forge the MAC in chosen 
cipher text attack.  In, (Chang et al, 2007)  , (Zoltak et al., 2004)  and (Karlof et al., 2004 ) 
suggested 4 bytes MAC gives well sufficient security, and easy to implement. Further, (Lim 
et al., 2007) and (Ahmad et al., 2009) suggested that the strongest definition of security for 
authenticated encryption can be achieved via Encrypt-then-MAC approach only. Encrypt-
then-MAC: (Ekey,Kmac(Msg) =Ekey(Msg)||Kmac(Ekey(Msg)) always gives privacy and authenticity 
to the air messages. 
5.2.5 Operation of NLM-MAC 
The operation of NLM-MAC is very simple, as follows: suppose, Alice simply computes a 
MAC on the encrypted packet with MAC key (kmac) and sends MAC packet and cipher text to 
the Bob. When Bob received the MAC packet (i.e., authenticated packet) and cipher text, 
then Bob verify the MAC packet which is sent by Alice. If MAC verified then Alice is 
authentic and no information has been altered in transit. NLM-MAC is an Encrypt-then-MAC 
stream cipher mode (Lim et al., 2007), as shown in figure 5.  
 
Fig. 5. Flow of NLM-MAC 
www.intechopen.com
NLM-MAC: Lightweight Secure Data Communication  
Framework Using Authenticated Encryption in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
163 
6. Implementation, evaluation, and security analysis  
This section discusses the implementation and evaluation of proposed framework. Further 
we compare and prove that the proposed scheme is efficient in term of resources 
consumption (i.e., memory and time efficiency) with existing schemes.  
6.1 Experimental set up and implementation 
In order to check the feasibility of NLM-MAC, we embedded the proposed scheme on real-
time test bed, which ran on two Telos B motes and one personal computer (Intel 3.166GHz) 
as base station. We have implemented NLM-MAC using TinyOS, an event-driven open 
source operating system, which is specially designed for wireless sensor networks. The 
application called “secure chitchat application”, and is written in NesC language. The secure 
chitchat application tested on Telos B sensor node that has a 16-bit, 8MHz MSP430 processor 
having 48 KB of programme space and 10 KB of flash memory. Further, the specifications of 
Telos B motes are shown in the table 1. 
 
TelosB specification 
ITEMs DESCRIPTION 
Processor 16-bit RICS 
Internal Memory 10-kb RAM 
Flash Memory 48-kb ROM 
Multi-Channel Radio 2.4-GHz(CC2420) 
Interface USB ( UART ) 
Sensors Temperature, Humidity, Light, etc. 
Table 1. Telos B node specification 
The experimental set up is depicted in figure 6, where sensor node ‘A’ acts as sender and the 
sensor node ‘B’ as receiver and vice versa. Personal computer (PC) is playing an important 
role as base station.  
 
Fig. 6. Experimental set up 
6.2 Evaluation 
This subsection evaluates the secure chitchat application that integrated with NLM-MAC 
based security services. For evaluation we have considered mainly, memory and CPU 
execution time. As shown in table 2, our entire code uses: (i) without security 11 KB of ROM 
and 450 Bytes of RAM; (ii) with encryption 12.4 KB ROM (i.e., 12.4-11= 1.3KB) and 559 Bytes 
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RAM (i.e., 559-450 = 109 bytes); and (iii) with NLM-MAC 13.74 KB ROM (i.e., 13.74-12.4 = 
1.4KB extra from encryption) and 632 Bytes RAM (i.e., 73 bytes extra from encryption). 
Further, the proposed scheme takes 13.35 ms time for encryption and 16.74ms for NLM-
MAC operation. It is easy to see from the table 2 that the proposed scheme leaves ample 
space for other application’s functions.   
 
Description 
ROM 
(BYTES) 
RAM 
(Bytes) 
Execution Time 
(ms) 
Without security scheme 11,412 453 
- 
 
NLM-128 
(Only Encryption) 
12, 442 559 13. 53 
NLM-MAC 13,749 632 16.74 
Table 2. Occupied memory and execution time of NLM-MAC  
In addition, to evaluate the simple performance of symmetric encryption and authentication 
(i.e. NLM-MAC) on data packets, we conducted some performance evaluation tests. As 
shown in the experimental set (fig 6), we simply sent 1000 data packets from sensor node A 
to sensor node B without any packet loss and vice versa.  In order to measure the 
throughput of the proposed scheme, the packet size ranges from 20 bytes to 100 bytes, with 
an incremental of 20 bytes, as depicted in the figure 7.  In only encryption case, the 
throughput is 23Kbps (i.e., for 20 bytes) to 25.9Kbps (for 100 bytes); and in NLM-MAC 
operation, it is 13.6Kbps (i.e., for 20 bytes) to 18.5Kbps (for 100bytes), which is reasonable for 
secure wireless sensor networks.  
 
Fig. 7. Data throughput for without Encryption, only encryption, and NLM-MAC.  
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6.2.1 Memory and execution time comparisons with other exiting stream ciphers 
This subsection compares NLM-128 with some existing stream ciphers that have been 
implemented or simulated in wireless sensor networks, recently. We compared the 
memory efficiency of proposed scheme with Lim et al.( 2007), Kumar & lee (2009) and 
Kausar & Naureen (2009).  Lim et al.( 2007) and Kumar & lee (2009) have implemented 
Dragon stream cipher that support to the link layer security on TelosB sensor platform. 
Kausar & Naureen (2009) have simulated HC-128 and Rabbit stream cipher on TinyOS 
and TOSSIM environment for sensor networks. As shown in table 3, the encryption 
operation of HC-128 simulation is very expensive and it required much memory (i.e., 
32.5KB of ROM and 10KB of RAM) and relatively low computation time (.049 ms). 
Whereas, the proposed scheme required only 12.44KB of ROM and 559bytes of RAM for 
message encryption, and 13.53 ms of computation time, which is practical on real-time 
test bed.  
 
 
Dragon 
encryption    
(Lim et 
al.,2007) 
Dragon 
encryption 
(Kumar& 
Lee, 2009) 
Rabbit 
encryption 
(Kausar & 
Naureen, 
2009) 
HC-128 
encryption  
(Kausar & 
Naureen,2009)
Proposed 
NLM-128 
encryption 
M E 
M O 
R Y 
Random-
access 
memory 
(RAM) 
18 KB 17.5 KB 14 KB 32.5KB 12.44KB 
Read-only 
memory 
(ROM) 
964 Bytes 915 Bytes 1KB 10KB 559 Bytes 
Execution 
time(ms) 
17.88 16.25 .039 .049 13. 53 
Table 3. Memory and execution time comparisons for encryption operation with other 
stream ciphers. 
The table 4 shows the memory comparison for MAC operation. As shown in the table 4, the 
NLM-MAC needs only 13.7KB of ROM and 632Bytes of RAM; whereas, in (Lim et al., 2007) 
Dragon-MAC needs 18.9KB of ROM and 982Bytes of RAM; and in (Kumar & Lee, 2009) 
Dragon-MAC needs 18.13KB of ROM and 948Bytes of RAM.  Moreover, NLM-MAC 
requires 16.74ms computation time for MAC operation, which is significantly low as 
compared to Lim et al., 2007 and Kumar & Lee, 2009.  Whereas, in Kausar & Naureen, 2009, 
authors did not implemented or analyzed MAC operation, which is paramount operation in 
WSN security.  
Consequently, it is very clear from table 3 and table 4 that the NLM-128 and NLM-MAC 
operations are memory efficient as compare to existing schemes.  
Furthermore, we have calculated the expected latency overhead incurred, if the packet 
length is increased then transmit time is also increased, as shown in Table 5. Analytically, 
standard Telos radio stack packet transmission time is 2.016 ms and NLM-MAC radio stack 
packet transmission time is 2.208 at 250 kbps bandwidth.  
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Dragon-MAC        
(Lim et al.,2007) 
Dragon–MAC 
(Kumar& Lee, 2009) 
Proposed 
NLM-MAC 
MEM-
ORY 
RAM 18.9KB 18KB 13.7KB 
ROM 982 bytes 948 bytes 632 bytes 
Execution time(ms) 21.40 20.35 16.74 
Table 4. Memory and execution time comparisons for MAC operation with other stream 
ciphers. 
 
Description 
Pay-load 
(Bytes) 
Packet 
Over-
head 
(Bytes) 
Total 
Size 
(Bytes) 
Trans-
mission 
time (ms) 
Over- 
head inc. 
% 
TinySec-AE 24 42 68 28.3 7.9 
TinyOS stack 24 39 63 26.2 _ 
Telos radio 
stack 
24 39 63 2.016 _ 
MiniSec 24 25 49 1.568 
_ 
 
NLM-MAC 24 45 69 2.208 9.5 
Table 5. Latency analysis 
6.3 Security analysis 
Based on the above experimental set up, we believe that the proposed NLM-MAC uses 
NLM-128 in a secure way and uses its strength and makes achieve more secure features, i.e., 
authentication and integrity. NLM-MAC has achieved basic requirement as discussed in 
section 3 and protect the air messages from an attacker, as follows. 
 Data confidentiality: The proposed framework achieves NLM-128 based data 
confidentiality through encrypting air messages. 
 Data authentication: The proposed framework facilitate data authentication through the 
MAC verification. 
 Data integrity: The proposed NLM-MAC also guarantees the data integrity through 
data authentication verification. 
Furthermore, all the operations in proposed schemes are simply uses XOR operations, 
which is cost effective. 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter tested the feasibility of stream cipher in sensor network where energy and 
computation time are important factors. We have designed NLM-MAC scheme for resource 
constrained devices. The proposed scheme employs on some of already computed data 
underlying NLM-128 cipher. The salient features of NLM-128 keystream generator are its 
fast key generation and fast software implementation, good primitives for security such as 
encryption, authentication, decryption and data integrity. The entity verification and 
message authentication have been tested through the performance of authenticated 
www.intechopen.com
NLM-MAC: Lightweight Secure Data Communication  
Framework Using Authenticated Encryption in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
167 
encryption schemes using Telos B sensor nodes for wireless sensor networks. The 
implementation of its features can revolutionize the security primitives in wireless sensor 
networks. As conclusion, this chapter found that the lightweight stream ciphers also can be 
a substitute of the block ciphers. Furthermore, the remaining feature of NLM-128 can be 
enhanced and implemented in wireless sensor networks as per the applications scenarios. 
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